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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NEWTON C. ESTES, 
Plaintiff and Pro 
Se Appellant, 
VS. 1 
ELDON BARNES, ( 
Warden, Utah State < 
Prison, Defendant J 
and Appellee ] 
i BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
i Case No. 900418 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Will any Foote parole relief ever really happen if 
the Courts continue to shield themselves from hearing their 
own same due process secret information violations that 
first put us in prison byi 
1) using a procedure not found in habeas rules to 
grant AG's dismissal motion? 
2) exhibiting an actual desire to continue 
incarcerations by refusing to review and rule upon the 
sentencing violations of statutes and case law as set forth 
in the twelve citations* of my Table of Authorities? 
3) following Judge Rigtrup*s pattern of "I do not 
second guess a trial court* whereby habeas corpus review of 
due process denials at sentencing for plea bargains no longer 
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takes place in Utah district courts? 
Must it not be assumed that this reluctance to 
hear the facts debated stems from their own participation 
with the prosecutor, defense attorney, and presentence 
preparer to hand down original, charge incarcerations based 
on information kept secret from the defendant? 
How can he correct another judge when he, 
himself, regularly presides over the following violations 
of due process and equal protection of the law? 
a) He notices affidavit defense attorney has 
gotten signed if for original charges, not the reduced ones, 
b) He accepts prosecutor's testimony and evidence 
in secret after telling defendant at pre trial none would be. 
c) Allows presentence report preparer to tell 
client he will not see the report. 
d) Bases his sentence on reporter's previous crime 
allegations he knows defendant has not seen. 
e) Or, if seen, refuses defendant apportunity to 
challenge and rebut. 
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
U.R. Civ. P. 65B(i) (1) first paragraph? (7) all? 
(8) all. 
77-18-1 (4) and 77.35-22 (a) are from my appeal 
by Jay Edmonds. I insert them here on the following page. 
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.TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
77-35 22(a)=*U.R. Or P. Rule 2 2 ( a ) 
Ut)on the entry of a plea or verdict 
of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall, set a time for imposing sen-
tence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 30 days after the verdict 
or plea, unless the court, with the con-
currence of the defendant, otherwise or-
ders. Pending sentence, the court may 
commit the defendant or may continue or 
alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court A / 
shall afford the defendant an opportunity rtr6fly 
to make a statement in his own behalf and \)\jj\ U
 n 
to present any information in mitigation |f£" - ffrt***' 
of punishment, or to show any legal cause '|fl 
why sentence should not be imposed. The 
prosecuting attorney shall also be given 
an opportunity to present any information 
material to the imposition of sentence. 
77-18-l(*0, U.C.A. (1953), as enacted by Laws, 
1.980 (as amended) also relates to the sentencing process: 
Prior to the imposition of any sentence, 
the court may, with the concurrence of the 
defendant, continue the date for the imposi-
tion of sentence for a reasonable period of 
time for the purpose of obtaining a presen-
tence investigation report from the Depart-
ment of Corrections or information from 
other sources about the defendant- . . .At 
the time of sentence, the court shall hear 
any testimony or information the defendant 
or the prosecuting attorney desires to pre-
sent concerning the appropriate sentence. 
^his testimony or information shall be pre-
sented in open court on record and in the 
presence of the defendant. 
77-35-13 is relevantly quoted at bottom of page 19 
of addendumized subject habeas corpus. 
As noted in the Table of Authorities, the relevant 
texts of the listed court decisions are located by their 
oage number in the subject habeas corpus addendum IN BOLD 
TYPE. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I hereby incorporate AG's recitation from pages one 
thru four of his memorandum in support of dismissal. I then 
add to it to bring it ut> to date. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN (4865) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NEWTON C. ESTES, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
M. ELDON BARNES, Warden 
Utah State Prison 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Case No. 900903466 
James S. Sawaya 
Defendant, by and through Dan R. Larsen, Assistant 
Attorney General, hereby submits the following memorandum in 
support of defendant's motion to dismiss. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS fen* Plaintiff pled guilty on June 21, 1988, to attempted 
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony, and to 
A 
dealing in harmful material to a minor, a third degree felony, in 
the Second Judicial District court, in and for Davis County, 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge, presiding. (See Exhibit MA"; 
Plea Affidavit.) Plaintiff was sentenced on July 19, 1988, by 
Judge Douglas Cornaby to serve concurrent terms of five years to 
life and zero to five years in the Utah State Prison. (See 
Exhibit "B"; Judgment, Sentence and Commitment.) 
On the day of sentencing, plaintiff filed a notice of 
appeal claiming that his due process rights were violated at the 
sentencing hearing by the consideration of the pre-sentence 
investigation report prepared by Adult Probation and Parole. 
(See Exhibit "C"; Notice.) On August 1, 1988, plaintiff filed 
with the Utah Supreme Court a pro se petition for certificate of 
probable cause and motion for stay of execution reiterating his 
due process claim. (See Exhibit "D"; Motion and Petition.) The 
petition and motion were denied on August 15, 1988, because 
plaintiff had not first sought relief in the District Court. 
(See Exhibit "E"; Order.) 
On or about August 30, 1988, plaintiff filed a motion 
seeking to correct alleged tampering with his sentencing hearing 
transcript. (See Exhibit "F"; Motion.) The Utah Supreme Court 
denied plaintiff's motion on September 19, 1988, because the 
issue was under consideration by the District Court. (See 
Exhibit "D"; Order.) 
6 
On or about September 8, 1988, plaintiff filed with the 
Utah Supreme Court a petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming 
that his sentence was a result of ineffective assistance of 
counsel and collusion on the part of the judge and prosecutor. 
(See Exhibit "H"; Petition.) The petition was dismissed by the 
Court on September 19, 1988, for the reason that the issues 
raised in the petition should be included in the pending appeal. 
(See Exhibit HI M; Order.) 
Plaintiff sought a certificate of probable cause in the 
district court claiming that he was prejudiced by the use of a 
presentence report and by alleged tampering with his sentencing 
transcript. (See Exhibit "J"; Certificate.) On September 27, 
1988, the district court denied plaintiff's application for 
certificate of probable cause finding that the issues raised by 
plaintiff were not novel, fairly debatable, or integral to 
plaintiff's conviction. 
Plaintiff then filed a new petition for certificate of 
probable cause in the Utah Supreme Court claiming: (1) that 
defense counsel was ineffective in the plea and sentencing 
process; (2) that the presentence report was wrongfully prepared 
and used by the sentencing court; (3) that the sentencing judge 
abused his discretion by imposing a prison term reither than 
probation; (4) that the dealing in harmful material to a minor 
7 
statute is unconstitutionally vague; and, (5) that the sentencing 
transcript was purposefully altered. (See Exhibit "K"; 
certificate.) The court denied the petition for certificate of 
probable cause on February 6, 1989. (See Exhibit ML"; Order). 
On appeal, plaintiff was represented by Jay D. Edmonds 
who filed a brief of appellant attacking plaintiff's guilty plea 
and sentence. (See Exhibit "M"; Brief.) After the case was 
poured over from the Utah Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed plaintiff's conviction and sentence in an unpublished 
opinion. State v. Estes, No. 880279-CA) Utah Ct. App. Nov. 16, 
1989). (See Exhibit "NM; Opinion.) 
Plaintiff then sought a pro se petition for writ of 
certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court requesting review of the 
Court of Appeals opinion. (See Exhibit "0"; Petition.) Review 
was denied by the Supreme Court on March 6, 1990. (See Exhibit 
T ; Order. ) 
On January 29, 1990, plaintiff filed a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus in the Utah Supreme Court resubmitting his 
September 8, 1988, petition which had been denied by the Supreme 
Court for the reason that all issues could be included in the 
pending direct appeal. (See Exhibit MQ"; Petition.) The new 
petition was referred to Judge Kenneth Rigtrup of the Third 
District Court. After a hearing on March 26, 1990, Judge Rigtrup 
entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in dismissing the 
petition for the reason that all the issues raised in plaintiff's 
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recycled petition could and should have been raised on direct appeal 
or-were raised and decided on appeal. (See Exhibit "rM? Findings 
of Pact and Conclusions of Law.) At present, plaintiff's appeal 
from Judge Rigtrup's order is pending in the Utah Supreme Court. 
(See Exhibit "S"; Appeal.) 
Plaintiff thereupon on June 2, 1990, filed a 
second Petition for Habeas Corpus Post Conviction Relief 
(Case #900903^66)—and which is the corpus of this appeal— 
for the purpose of preserving for federal 225^ review 
appellant counsel's ineffectiveness for having refused to 
raise plaintiff's announced intention to found his appeal 
on ineffectiveness of hi© pre-trial and sentencing attorney. 
Judge Sawaya on June 22, 1990, used UCJA 4-501 (l)(d) to 
grant Larsen's dismissal motion without any hearing 
whatsoever. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
I hereby incorporate pages 5 thru 10 from the 
statement I included in my January 3, 1990, writ of 
certiorari- I then add to it to bring it up to date. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1) On Friday, July 15, 1988, I learned from AP&P 
investigator, Judy Valeika, that late that day she had given 
Judge Cornaby the biggest presentence report ever compiled in 
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Davis County (R.48) which contained the reaaons for life 
no 
Imprisonment but which I had y£ right to examine. I thereupon 
prepared a Notice of Appeal (R.34) to present at the Tuesday, 
July 19th sentencing. It stated how I had been misled at Plea 
Bargain <T1 page 10 lines 18 and 19) by the courta' statement 
that no evidence or testimony would be presented to Judge 
Cornaby. See also Memorandum In Support of Probable Cause (R.71 
pages 5 and 6 and Addendum #3 2/7/89). 
One half hour before sentencing was scheduled, my 
lawyer handed me the huge report. From this cursory review I 
saw it was full of outright lies, rumors and innuendo©. I then 
hand wrote on my typed notice, "lies heavily solicited by Judy 
Valelka" and presented it to the Court during sentencing. 
I never had seen or even heard about the two 
prosecution documents called "Notice of Intent to Present 
_ n\cn~hhs 
Evidence and to Use Hearsay Testimony" (R.48) till eight monthla 
later when Supreme Court Clerk, Geoff Butler, sent the 
presentence report to me In prison. 
tf 
a) On July 12, 1988, one week prior to 
sentencing, I was summoned to Farmington courthouse by my lawyer 
to help him oppose the prosecutor's presentation of "Playboy" 
and other sesrch warrant evidence to the judge in hia chambers. 
These documents are contained as sppendlxes In Brief of 
Appellant and Brief of Respondent. Namba dated them July 6, 
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1988. After a half hour wait during which I aaw Namba, my 
lawyer and Judy Veleika confer in the aecond floor lobby, 
Vanderlinden told me to go back to work that, "All had been 
taken care of*. Thla acenario waa aet forth in the following 
court documents: on page 5 and 6 of my 9/8/88 Memorandum in 
Support of Habeaa Corpua and 12/31/88 Memorandum in Support of 
Probable Cauae (R.71 item q pace 16). 
Aa a reault, highly Inflammatory, damaging 
Information waa preaented to the judge that I never aaw till I 
waa aeven months in prlaon, but which formed a major basis for 
his giving me life imprisonment in lieu of probation. 
b) On July 12, 1988, becauae of the facts set 
forth in item a) above, the Diatrict Court cauaed a Minute Entry 
be placed in the file, <aee addendum in Appellant's Brief) that 
aald I waa preaent during Namba'e presentation* The Appeala 
Court cited thia entry aa proof I aaw and approved the documents 
and thereby gave up my right to confront and rebut their 
contenta in open court* 
% 
2) During the July 19, 1988 sentencing hearing <T2) I 
challenged again and again the accuracy of the presentence 
report and claimed I should have a right to rebut it. Qn page 3 
lines 18 thru 22 my lswyer said I wanted to challenge the 
statement of the neighborhood collateral contacta. On page 3 
lines 10 thru 16 I was shown to want to challenge harmful 
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innuendoa about taking neighborhood boya skiing. On page 3 
lines 16 and 19 I waa shown to believe alleged statements of 
parenta were not true. On page 4 llnea 13 and 14 I waa ahown to 
feel all the rumors were eomlataly out of hand. On page 11 
llnea 9 thru 11 I said the collateral contact recapa contained 
solicited innuendos rather than genuine opinions. On page 11 
llnea 20 thru 25 and following. I aaid the interview reporta had 
been deliberately twiated to suggest wrongdoing. On page 12 
llnea 5 thru 11 I atate the innuendos lead to the exact oppoaite 
of the truth and need to be subjected to rebuttal. 
All theae complainta were baaed on reviewing leaa 
than 1/5 of the report. When finally sent me by Supreme Court 
Clerk, Geoff Butler, I spent 2 days snalyzing the whole report 
and writing ten (10) pages of rebuttal I hoped to get into the 
record at some stage. 
X 
Of all the neighborhood collateral contacts, not 
one said they knew of a single instance of even a suggestion of 
specific sexual misconduct. This bottom line conclusion waa, 
for reasons best known to Judy Valeika, never articulated or 
even hinted at. She overwhelmed thia baaic concluaion with 
thirty (30) pages of rumors and innuendos about my power to 
manipulate children, neighborhood feara, and that I had Intent 
to commit other sexual Crimea. 
After all theae neighborhood and my 
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daughters'interviews failed to show any kind of aexual 
aiaconduct, Ma. Valelka, during the week of July 10th, informed 
me that the AP&P needed aome aerioua inatance of paat aexual 
miaconduct or elae I could not be recommended for treatment on 
the outside, but would have to be incarcerated for willful 
inexcusable sexual misconduct. I invented a story <T2 lines 11 
thru IS). 
Thla ia the background of her report on me on page 
14 next to last paragraph (R.46) that caused Judge Cornaby'a 
rebuttal to my claim of a clean paat that I had Indeed moleated 
a girl 39 years ago <T2 page 6 line 24 thru paoe 7 line 20). 
3) The unrebutted misinformation of the presentence 
report plus the aecret inflammatory information preaented by the 
prosecutor to the judge resulted in great harm to me at 
x 
sentencing aa can be judged by the following remarka of Judge 
Cornaby'a contained in the aentencing transcript <T2> : page 3 
line 23 thru page 4 line 11 he saya I would be able to change 
wltneaaea' true atoriea into untrue onea if he allowed me to 
examine them. He accuses me of writing my wife's letter to him 
and gets called a liar by the one who was with her when she 
wrote it. (gee also T3 page 9 lines 19 thru 25). 
Page 9 lines 2 thru line 9 page 10 he concludes my 
hitting Justice White (who waa not injured) waa a prior act of 
violence rather than one of civil disobedience. 
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Page 13 lines 7 thru 11 he uses the unrebutted 
preaentence report to overrule Dr. Roby's ISAT 8-page 
psychological exam report <R.4S) that testing " 
did not indicate that he BU££^TB from 
the sane degree of psychopathology which 
the vast majority of those assessed for 
similar offenses do...Cand3 fails to 
suggest any underlying major affective 
or characterological disorders to which 
Newt's sexually illicit behavior may be 
attributed...Cand] Newt appears a much 
IBBB pathological picture than most 
offenders this examiner has evaluated... 
land it would be this examiner's 
recommendation that Newt not be 
incarcerated at either Utah State Prlaon 
or Utah State Hospital since he does not 
appear to need the intensity of 
treatment or supervision such facilities 
provide...tand3 this examiner feels, in 
this case, it might be best to require 
Newt Estes to successfully complete BTI 
outpatient program..." 
X 
Page 14 line 20 thru line 7 page 15 Cornaby 
Instead says 1 am a high risk offender who tries to replace 
parental relationships because Z have en Intent to have sex with 
them and that I have long had deep-seated sexual problems. 
page 15 lines 15 thru 18 saya I hit Justice White 
because that Court would not protect me from my own weaknesses -
wheress I ected on the fact that it waa tyranny to deprive local 
governments of their right (should they desire to do so) to 
promote the general welfare as had always been done in the past 
by moat non-seaport communitlea. 
1* 
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT 
1) It was a violation of constitutional rights to due 
process to be told at guilty plea that the State would not 
present any evidence or testimony because it thereupon went 
ahead and presented all this evidence and other material which 
would not have been admissable at trial. 
To have used all this evidence to determine the 
defendant's punishment while preventing him from even learning 
of the contents so he could rebut them is an unspeakable assault 
on due proc^mB. 
k) Judge Sawaya, in addition to going outside the 
rules of 65B(i) to grant Larsen's dismissal motion, did not 
even bother to either acknowledge or rule upon nr£ 6/29/90 
Notice to Submit which I had correctly extrapolated from 
65B(i)(6) governing habeas response deadlines. Whereas I 
could not get him to use the rules in jny behalf, he went 
outside them to help the AG. 
It is obvious that my second habeas petition's 
June 2nd Motion that Habeas Not Come Before Judge Rigtrup 
was useless against the AG-habeas court conspiracy. 
5) On September 5, 1990 this Court rejected my 
Rigtrup dismissal appeal without comment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
in • i n ii i • i| in i • • 
Habeas Corpus review of improper sentencing of 
rclea-bargain defendants (and probably most others as well) 
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is de facto no longer available. These improprieties violate 
the Utah and U.S. Constitutions, a whole body of state and 
federal case law, as well as specific state statutes. 
They occur because the district court, prosecutor, 
defense attorney and the AP&P reporter have agreed to collect 
and use secret, incriminating and unverified information to 
justify imposing original charge sentences. 
Consequently the district judge in the prison's area, 
so as not to condemn actions he, himself, regularly practices, 
engages with the AG in a sham procedure of using rules not 
found in 65B(i) in order to protect the AG from ever having 
to answer, and the judge -from ever having to hear, the due 
process violations in the commitment proceedings, Habeas 
Corpus dies right there, 
Their conspiracy works so well the judge need not 
even read the petition, rule on any defendant motions, or 
even have him notified of his court date. 
THE ARGUMENT* 
•The arguments/discussions with case law citations 
are in the attached addendum Second Petition for Habeas 
Corpus Post Conviction Relief. I presume referring there 
will not inconvenience. 
1) Steve Vanderlinden presented me an affidavit 
containing the original rather than reduced charges. (See 
my Rigtrup habeas memorandum #900901219, page five, items 
b and c. I refused to sign this fraud? he threw in waste 
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basket, and I retrieved and saved it. 
At pre-trial. Judge Cornaby did not ask what 
happened to cause eight minutes and -pages 2, 3 and 4 of the 
transcript to be used to reduce the charges in the courtrooom. 
As set forth for you on page k> of my #900015 appeal.f 
Judge RigtruT)fs dismissal prevented my showing him that bogus 
affidavit I had in my hands as I stood before him, 
I argue that these events could not occur unless 
both judges themselves routinely accept original charge 
affidavits from plea-bargain inmates. (Out of seven roommates, 
four had this happen to them. ) 
2) After hearing me told at pre-trial no evidence 
or testimony would come before the court, prosecutor Namba 
nevertheless presented proposed testimony and search warrant 
evidence. 
With Vanderlinden's connivance, it was done secretly 
in chambers. It was full of lies and prejudicial conclusions. 
I was in prison before I saw these two documents. 
SEE PAGES 19 and 20 FOR TEXTS AND DISCUSSION OF THE 
VIOLATED STATE AND CASE LAWS. ALSO PAGE 14 SECOND PARAGRAPH. 
3) * w a s told by AP&P reporter I could not examine her 
presentence report. My lawyer complied by neglecting to go 
fetch it and call me in to review the immense 130-page document. 
He tossed it to me 20 minutes before sentencing was scheduled. 
A#t>t was full of lies too numerous and serious to properly rebut 
without hours of preparation. 
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SOME OP THOSE LIES ARE SET FORTH ON PAGES k9 5 AND 6. 
4) At sentencing, I told Judge Cornaby it was full 
of lies I wanted to challenge. He ridiculed this demand. My 
lawyer remained silent. The judgef thereupon, says the report 
causes him to override Dr. Roby's assessment that I am a very 
low-risk offender. I hand him a Notice of Appeal then and 
there. Vanderlinden remains silent. 
A detailed account of those proceedings with 
transcript citations were filed in this Court on pages 7 thru 
10 of my 1/13/90 Writ of Certiorari and are previously inserted 
herein. 
THE TEXT? AND DISCUSSION OP STATUTE AND CASE LAW 
JUDGE CORNABY VIOLATED IN MY SENTENCING ARE ON PAGES 16 THRU 19. 
VANDERLINDEN1S DERELICTION IN ASSISTING THE COURT TO 
PROCEED ON INACCURATE INFORMATION IS SHOWN ON PAGES 12 THRU 15-
IT QUALIFIES ME AS A VICTIM OF STRICTLAND VS. WASHINGTON'S 
INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL DESERVING HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF. 
5) I am in a prison which unconstitutionally provides 
no law library or appeal lawyers (as well as no copy machines, 
our own, or any, typewriter). 
I, therefore, have no means to examine any case law 
which Larsen claims allows the court in a 65B(i) action to 
disregard its rules and go to another book to come up with 
the administrative rule UCJA 4-501(d) as a purported ground 
for dismissing a habeas without so much as even a hearing on 
that motion. 
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I have twice moved the courts to require the AG 
to furnish texts of his cited cases, but I now presume that 
since theirs and the AGfs purposes are the same, they were 
never even read. I do know they were never acknowledged or 
ruled upon. 
Having thus far been unable to penetrate this 
sham of justice, I have, nevertheless, been able, to "Drove 
beyond a shadow of doubt that "unusual circumstances11 show 
fundamental fairness must put an end to these summary 
dismissals. 
THE TEXT AND ARGUMENT OF THE RELEVANT HURST V. COOK 
AND OTHER DECISIONS IS ON PAGES 8 THRU 12, 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant orays his guilty plea be ruled unknowing 
of the consequences, and thus involuntary? that his sentence 
be vacated for not having been imposed in accordance with 
Utah statutes and case law; and that he be unconditionally 
released from prison since inaccurate information caused 
his being sentenced as a dangerous repeat offender, rather 
than receiving probation as would be normal for a 63-year—old 
low-risk first time offender 
I pray Third District's denial of due process will 
now be reversed. 
In addition, he would move the court to appoint 
counsel for any courtroom hearings; and to retrieve record 
19 
from district court. 
He wouldf alsof move that the AG be ordered to 
furnish the text of any cases his response may cite. 
He would also move that the CLerk be instructed 
to mark all envelopes -privileged Legal Mail" to save 2 to 
5 days of delivery time. (This habeas was dismissed 
because I did not answer in five days.) 
Respectfully submitted this I>Qt~~' day of April, 
1991. 
NEWTON C. ESTES 
NEWTON C. ESTES, 
Attorney Pro Se 
Utah State Prison #18884 
Draper, UT 84020 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE 
NEWTON COLLIER ESTES, 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
-VS-
UTAH STATE PRISON WARDEN, 
Eldon Barnes, 
Defendant. 
SECOND PETITION FOR HABEAS 
CORPUS POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
Case #900901219 
Case # 
Petitioner, NEWTON COLLIER ESTES, asserting that there was a 
substantial denial of my rights under the Constitutions of Utah 
and the United States in the proceedings which resulted in my 
incarceration, now proceeds in accordance with URCP 65B(i) and 
with Hurst v. Cook. 
I am now illegally restrained at the Utah State Prison 
at Draper from a life sentence I received July 19, 1988 in Judge 
Cornaby's Second District Court for pleading guilty to one 
attempt to fondle our 12-year-old part-time maid (76-5-404.1). 
My restraint is illegal because (a) my appellate counsel 
refused to ask for a judgment (and thus preserve for federal 
review) on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim my 
probable cause application said would be the fundamental element 
of my appeal (see attached affidavit); (b) appellate counsel 
was negligent in not federaly preserving the other due process 
violations by his forgetting to cite the applicable U.S. 
Constitution provisions. And finally (c) because my appellate 
counsel refused my request to answer those points of Respondent's 
Brief which turned out to be the same ones used by the Court of 
Appeals to deny my appeal. 
ISSUE TO BE RAISED: Was appellate counsel's performance 
so deficient as to be violative of the Sixth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution and Article One Section Twelve of the Utah 
Constitution? 
In support of the preceeding three allegations of this 
complaint, I ATTACH THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS: 
a) My announced intention to base my appeal on 
ineffectiveness of counsel is shown on the attached Supreme Court 
Probable Cause Memorandum (1) pages 4, 11, 12, 17, 18 and 19. 
On those last two pages I called the Court's attention 
to pages from the Transcript of my district court Probable Cause 
Hearing (2) where I told Judge Cornaby that my lawyer had 
knowingly participated in my being sentenced on unseen or 
inaccurate information by his not reviewing with me the 
presentence report. Our colloquy starts at line 19 on page 25, 
continues thru page 26, then takes up again on pages 30 thru 33 
(all attached). 
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In spite of his possessing all these records, Jay 
Edmonds refused in his 1-23-89 attached letter (3) to raise 
ineffectiveness on my appeal, 
b) Pages iii and iv (Table of Authorities) of Jay 
Edmond's Appeal Brief showing he used no U.S. Constitutional 
citations to preserve for federal habeas corpus review his many 
offhand references to the Constitution and due process. 
c) My six-page 7-6-89 letter (1) to Jay Edmonds asking 
him to respond to the wrongful claims in Respondent's Brief that 
(My Item 1) I had ample time to review the report, that it 
contained no misinformation, and I asked for no rebuttal 
opportunity; that I failed to show (My Item 3) how I could have 
rebutted the presentence report; and (My Item 4) that I was 
"present" and knew and approved the contents and submittal in 
chambers of two prosecutor documents of evidence, proposed 
testimony, and a very harsh sentence recommendation. 
Copy of the Appeal Court opinion (2) where, on page 4, 
that I had plenty of review time; where, on page 6, that I asked 
for no rebuttal, nor did I show what I could have rebutted; and 
where, on page 5, that I knew the contents of those two 
prosecutor documents and was present to ask that they be 
presented in chambers. 
My 7-29-89 questionnaire letter (3) written in 
desperation to Jay Edmonds after his failure to respond to mine 
asking him to answer Respondent's Brief and to all the other 
letters I had written him. 
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**Please note on page 5 of my 7-6-89 letter where I 
asked that he not let Appeals Court "have any misunderstanding" 
on my being present to approve submission of those two prosecutor 
documents I had never seen or heard about. Also note on page 4 
my asking if his failure to offer the contents of my 10-page 
rebuttal to the lies in the presentence report was because he 
planned to offer them at oral argument. 
PRESENTENCE REPORT LIES 
I will now set forth some of those lies which Jay 
Edmonds refused my request to present to the Appeals Court, and 
which Judge Cornaby said caused him to conclude I was a dangerous 
repeat offender, and which will cause the Parole Board to reach 
the same conclusion: 
1) Reference is made in two places (pg. 8 4 and pg. 
24 4) that a neighbor "knew he got one other girl - she got up 
and moved away after they found out." I would have rebutted that 
one mother allowed both her daughters to regularly visit us till 
she remarried and moved to Bountiful. Why didn't the 
investigator, Judy Valeika, ask who this other girl was and go 
question her and her mother before having the judge believe there 
was another victim? 
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2) Valeika also told the judge at page 8 4 that it 
"almost happened" to another girl. Her subsequent interview with 
that girl failed to reveal so much as even a suggestion of an 
improper touch. Why did she then want the judge to think it had? 
3) Valeika1s reporting at page 9 3 and page 17 2, 
that the victim's "fear of retaliation haunts us" would 
have been discredited by my showing the victim repeatedly came 
over to harass me in my yard or on the front porch after 
arraignment. 
4) Valeika went to great lengths on page 17 2, page 20 
last , and page 24 4 to impugn improper conduct between me and 
a boy I was helping learn how to use our lawnmower. If she 
really had wanted the judge to have helpful and accurate 
information, she would have gone to see him and ascertained that 
nothing improper had ever occurred. 
If she had followed a procedure of fundamental fairness 
rather than one of burying the truth with pages of scurrilous 
lies and hearsay innuendos, I would be a free man today. I would 
also be free if I had been allowed to make these challenges in 
either the district or appeals court. Will Mr. Larsen now try to 
see that I am not allowed to challenge the lies by habeas corpus? 
5) Valeika used 5 on page 18 and all of pages 23 and 
24 to tell the judge a diatribe of a mother's worthless innuendo 
to suggest an improper relationship with her son. However, all 
the judge should have wanted to hear would have been the one 
sentence at page 23 2 that "Mrs. Goodliffe told this agent that 
Eric swore that Newton never did anything to him, and he still 
swears this." 
I hereby attach those two pages 23 and 24 (attachment d) 
to give the Court some idea of the kind of stuff she used to 
overwhelm the judge with so he would go along with her maximum 
punishment recommendation• 
That such as this would find its way into a Utah 
courtroom, and rebuttal be refused, is a disgrace to the Bill of 
Rights. 
I could recite much, much more, including an amazing 
inexplicable gun enhancement. Need I do so to prove that, but 
for the ineffectiveness of counsel, either Judge Cornaby or the 
Court of Apeals would have learned that I could and would have 
rebutted the deceitful, flagrant innuendos and outright lies the 
AP&P Dept. presented to Judge Cornaby, if I had been allowed to? 
I could have replaced their deceit with the bottom-line summary 
it so successfully hides, namely that despite tremendous 
opportunity, I had never come close to molesting another child. 
Because my previous Petition to this Court was dismissed 
without a hearing on the finding that I improperly raised issues 
which could have or should have been raised on direct appeal, and 
which the Court lacks authority to re-examine, I now proceed in 
accordance with 65B(i)(4). I HAVE SHOWN HEREIN GOOD CAUSE 
(INEFFECTIVENESS OF APPELLANT COUNSEL) IN THIS SECOND APPLICATION 
WHY THERE WERE "UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES" WHICH PREVENTED MY APPEAL 
FROM SPECIFYING THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM I HAD 
SAID IN MY PROBABLE CAUSE PETITION IT WOULD CONTAIN. 
This same ineffectiveness caused a non-response to 
Respondent's Brief to deny me my right to have what appeal there 
was to be truly judged on its merits. 
The accompanying Supporting Memorandum will show how a 
denial of this petition would amount to a ''fundamental 
unfairness" and would as well deny me my Fifth Amendment rights 
to due process of law. 
The petitioner would assert that the issues raised in 
his petition have not been previously adjudicated in any 
proceeding. 
Wherefore, the petitioner having no other adequate 
remedy at law would request that this court order relief as 
follows: 
That the court issue its extraordinary writ in the 
nature of habeas corpus, releasing the person of the petitioner, 
Newton C. Estes, from the custody of Utah Department of 
Corrections, or, remanding Petitioner's conviction to the Second 
Judicial Court of Davis County, with an order that the State of 
Utah within an appropriate period, decides on how it elects to 
proceed thereon, or in a lesser event grant the petitioner, 
Newton C. Estes, an evidentiary hearing, before this court, so 
that petitioner may more fully develop related facts herein, that 
the court may determine relief that would be just and equitable 
under said circumstances in the case at bar. 
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Respectfully submitted this day of 
1990. 
Newton C. Estes In Pro Se 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
SUCCESSIVE WRITS HURST v. COOK 
I, Petitioner, Newton Collier Estes, now lists the 
circumstances which resulted in the fundamental unfairness that 
triggers the Hurst vs. Cook 113 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 "unusual 
circumstances" test governing initial or successive use of Utah's 
65B(i) habeas post conviction procedure where a sentence has once 
been supposedly "fully and fairly adjudicated on appeal or in a 
prior habeas proceeding." 
I am entitled to such successive use because my 
collateral attack is made in the above unusual circumstances of 
"where an obvious injustice of a substantial and prejudicial 
denial of a Constitutional right has occurred, irrespective of 
whether an appeal has been taken." Habeas is the correct 
procedure "for assuring that one is not deprived of life or 
liberty irrespective of whether the error was categorized as 
jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional." This is "so that a 
prisoner will always be able to raise his claim in a state Court 
and thus there will be no occasion for federal habeas corpus, 
because a state remedy is available." 
This procedure has the function "to provide a means for 
collaterally attacking convictions when they are so 
Constitutionally flawed that they result in fundamental 
unfairness." Hurst says "the general judicial policy favoring 
the finality of judgments cannot, therefore, always prevail 
against an attack by a writ of habeas corpus'1 because it "does 
not have a higher value than Constitutional guarantees of 
liberty" and because such protection "is of greater 
importance than is res judicata." It then goes on to quote the 
U.S. Supreme Court's stating in Sanders vs. United states, 373 
US1, 8 (1963) "the inapplicability of res judicata to 
habeas is inherent in the very role and function of the 
writ." 
Hurst also quotes Martinez, 602 P2d at 702's reason for such 
suspension of the rules is so that "the law should not be so 
blind and unreasoning that where an injustice has resulted, the 
defendant should be without remedy." Then it uses Cordianna, 660 
P2d at 1115 to emphasize "the unusual circumstances test was 
intended to assure fundamental fairness and to require 
reexamination on habeas corpus when the nature of the alleged 
error was such that it would be unconscionable not to reexamine." 
The Utah Supreme Court often considers habeas claims 
"even though the issues raised were known or should have been 
known at the time of initial appeal." A prime example of its 
doing so is when there was "ineffectiveness of 
counsel especially in the investigation and preparation of a 
case." (My whole case-sentencing-was based on three documents -
two of which Vanderlinden never showed me or told me existed, and 
the third, 130 pages long, he never gave me time to read, nor did 
he, himself, examine over 1/5 of it, even though he saw it 
disagreed with everything I had told him. All three documents 
were totally incriminating.) To further back up my right to 
claim habeas review of the outcome of my appeal, I cite 
Commonwealth v. Hayes (1979) 411 A2d 769 conclusion "however, he 
is claiming the ineffectiveness of prior appellate counsel, and a 
question may not be considered finally litigated or waived in a 
proceeding in which the convict has been denied effective 
assistance." Likewise Commonwealth v. Allen (1980) 421 A2d 1094 
held that "ineffectiveness of counsel constitutes extraordinary 
circumstances precluding a finding of waiver " 
In light of all of the above, why did Mr. Larsen, if he 
believes everyone should be sentenced on accurate information as 
required by law and Constitutional due process, unfairly subject 
me, without law books or lawyer, to the rigors implied in Schad 
v. Turner 27 Utah 2d 345? Namely that "res judicata applies in 
full force to habeas cases" when our highest court has said that 
such a proposition was never the law, was largely ignored (except 
by Mr. Larsen) and that herein (Hurst) "it is overruled". Why 
would he cite Hurst in his motion to dismiss when almost the 
whole decision is taken up in showing the part he cited does not 
apply in a case such as mine? Why? Why? 
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I have clearly shown that if I can further back up the 
assertions of ray complaint, I will qualify under Hurst as one for 
whom "successive petitions should be permitted if for some 
justifiable reason (I) was previously unable to assert the rights 
or was unaware of the significance of relevant facts." The 
assertions in my petition also qualify me to an exception to the 
65B(i)(4) rule allowing one petition only for all claims because 
State v. West, 765 P2d 891 "nonetheless allows any number of post 
conviction complaints if good cause is shown." 
And I have shown the "good cause" that justifies a 
successive claim because I have established "new facts not 
previously known which would show the denial of a Constitutional 
right and the existence of fundamental unfairness in a 
conviction". I have thus met my "burden" as a second petitioner 
"to show the ends of justice would be served by permitting a 
redetermination of the ground". 
Petitioner believes his habeas shows flagrant 
Constitutional due process and effective counsel deprivations. 
However, he need not claim 65B(i) grounds of "substantial denial 
of his rights" under the Utah and U.S. Constitutions because 
Hurst says petitioner need only show sentencing and appeal were 
infected with a fundamental unfairness "which might fall short of 
invoking the due process clause, but which nevertheless raises a 
fair question as to whether a new trial should be granted". 
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Having established my right to a successive habeas 
complaint by showing the requisite "unusual circumstances" 
(ineffective assistance of appellate counsel), I now ask the 
Court to further use this action to examine those issues which 
that ineffectiveness prevented the appeals court from 
considering. 
The following three issues which my counsel refused my 
requests to raise on appeal or in answer to Respondent's Brief 
are what have caused a substantial denial of my rights under the 
U.S. and Utah Constitutions to occur in the proceedings which 
resulted in my incarceration and its affirmation. 
I. INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL 
DISCUSSION/ARGUMENT 
All these citations are from Strictland v. Washington 
(1984) 80L Ed 2d unless otherwise referenced. 
Before stating "Since fundamental fairness is the 
central concern of the writ of habeas corpus, no special 
standards ought to apply to ineffectiveness claims in habeas 
proceedings" (33), the Court said a fair trial "is one in which 
evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an 
impartial tribunal." (2,3). To assure such a fair trial the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals said in McGee v. Crist (1984) 
739 F 2d505 that "the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective 
assistance of counsel demands that the defense counsel exercise 
the skill, judgment and diligence of a reasonably competent 
defense attorney." The Court's benchmark for deciding if the 
assistance met Sixth Amendment standards was "whether counsel's 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a 
just result." (8) 
The "unusual circumstance" evidence accompanying my 
Petition showing Appellate counsel's refusal to raise my basic 
claim of ineffectiveness of guilty-plea assistance clearly 
qualifies me to the exemption in Commonwealth v. Hayes (1979) 
411 A2d 769 where, after stating "It is well-settled that the 
failure to raise an incompetency argument at the first 
opportunity without a claim of extraordinary circumstances 
justifying the failure results in waiver...," the court remanded 
because appellate counsel's failure was such that "a question may 
not be considered finally litigated or waived in a proceeding in 
which the convict has been denied effective assistance." 
A petitioner must then show that "there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different." (25). (In 
all my previous pleadings I had undertaken to show that the 
unrebutted lies and innuendos of the presentence report caused 
the Court to overrule Dr. Roby's assessment which said that I, a 
first-time offender, presented less danger than almost any client 
he ever examined, and for it to then brand me, instead, a 
high-risk offender with long-standing, deep-seated sexual 
problems with an intent to molest more children.) 
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Aside from Judge Cornaby's refusal of, and 
Vanderlinden1s failure to assert my demands for rebuttal, the 
denial of due process at sentencing stemmed from counsel's 
failure in those "particular duties to consult with the defendant 
on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of 
important developments in the course of the prosecution. Counsel 
also has the duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as 
will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process." 
(12). By never consulting with me to plan opposition to the 
contents of the presentence report which contradicted everything 
he had learned from me, he failed me the same way as happened in 
People v. Pulley (1979) 394NE 2d47 where there was "nothing in 
the record to indicate that counsel conferred to ascertain his 
contentions of error, or filed a withdrawal motion pursuant to 
judicial rules, and therefore the defendant was denied effective 
assistance." 
I assert that my result, along with the inexcusable lack 
of consultation, overcomes "the presumption that, under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound 
trial strategy" (14, 15). Add his never letting me know the 
existence, let alone the contents of the prosecutor's in-chambers 
presentation of evidence and proposed testimony and a maximum 
sentence recommendation which my attorney never told me had been 
made, I believe I have fulfilled my burden to "identify the acts 
or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the 
result of professional judgment" (16, 17). At sentencing, my 
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lawyer, after reading my Notice of Appeal before I handed it to 
the judge, additionally failed to make the motion to withdraw my 
guilty plea necessary to any appeal. 
Since he never consulted with me on any of these 
matters, he failed to live up to the norm that "Counsel's actions 
are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices 
made by the defendant and on information supplied by defendant" 
(19). 
I submit the citations and circumstances set forth above 
show I would probably have received a minimum sentence had it not 
been for my counsel's errors and neglect, and that probability is 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Had he asked 
for a continuance to expose the lies in the presentence report, 
"it is reasonably probable that competent counsel could have 
combined the exculpatory evidence with favorable character 
evidence to produce an effective case for leniency", Johnson v. 
Kemp 615F, Supp at 364 (1985). 
Therefore habeas should be granted to explore "whether 
there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the 
sentencer-including the Appellate Court, to the extent it 
independently reweighs the evidence-would have concluded that the 
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not 
warrant death" (27, 28). 
I assert that in my case "the result of the particular 
proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the 
adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just 
results" (30) . - | £ -
II. PRESENTENCE REPORT DISCUSSION/ARGUMENT 
In Utah v. Lipsky 608 P.2d 1241 (1980) the sentence was 
overturned because defendant never got his hands on the 
report-even though he had asked the report be prepared, heard all 
its relevant contents reviewed, but heard nothing to challenge. 
In my case I did not a^k for the report, was prevented by my 
lawyer from ever learning most of the contents, vigorously 
challenged what I did see, and was refused opportunity to rebut 
by the Court to which my lawyer, Steve Vanderlinden, spoke not 
one word in objection. 
The Court said "fundamental fairness requires that 
presentence report be disclosed to defendant prior to 
sentencing." The trial Court made days available for review to 
my attorney, but he did not show it to me till too late (one-half 
hour) to review-and plan rebuttal. The Court knew he hadn't. 
Together they denied me that fundamental fairness the Utah 
Constitution requires, and which led Utah v. Howell 707 P.2d 
(1985) to "the due process clause of Article 1, Section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution requires that a sentencing judge act on 
reasonable reliable and relevant information in exercising 
discretion in fixing a sentence." 
My sentencing transcript clearly violates the Lipsky 
dictum on page 244 that, after disclosure, "If the defendant 
thinks the report inaccurate, he should then have the opportunity 
to bring such inaccuracies to the Court's attention. I was not 
given the opportunity then. This petition asks that I be 
released or given it now. 
Ineffectiveness denied my Lipsky "right of a defendant 
to at least know the substance of the presentence report..." and 
the Court's ridiculing my demands for rebuttal showed complete 
disregard for my right and his duty..."to prevent a court from 
proceeding on inaccuracies." 
Why are efforts still being made to deny me Lipsky1s New 
Jersey citation that "fundamental fairness required that a 
defendant be given the opportunity to examine fully and 
controvert any prejudicial information that played a part in the 
sentencing procedures"? Especially when that prejudicial 
information caused the judge to rule that I, a first-time 
offender, professionally judged as unlikely to repeat, was given 
life in prison because I was a dangerous, habitual offender with 
deep-seated sex problems and an intent to commit more sex crimes? 
Compare what happened to me with Lipsky: "the 
information about the defendant must be accurate if society and 
the individual are to be properly served." 
Utah v. Casarez 656 P.2d 1005 (1982) saying "Procedural 
fairness is as obligatory at the sentencing phase of a trial as 
at the guilt phase", remanded so the report's contents could be 
reviewed. It added "if the defendant cannot inspect the contents 
of the presentence report, his Constitutional right to the 
effective assistance of counsel is seriously impaired if a judge 
may rely on information which may be inaccurate and is unknown to 
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the defendant." Of course, my counsel had aready deprived me of 
that right, himself, by concealing the contents till too late to 
identify and organize a rebuttal. 
He thus succeeded in supplying the judge what he needed 
to mock Casarez at page 1008 where "there is no substantial 
reason for sentencing criminal defendants on the basis of 
confidential information gleaned from a variety of more-or-less 
reliable sources without affording those defendants some 
opportunity to point out mistakes in that information." All he 
needed, and got, was for Vanderlinden not to go g€>t the report so 
I would have no time to read and answer it. 
Mr. Larsen already knew every citation I finally 
discovered for this Memorandum. His "fundamental fairness" was 
to pretend they don't exist and have the largest law firm in Utah 
engage in "adversarial process" against someone whose right to a 
prison lawyer or law library he would also oppose. Conversely, 
he believes in supporting what Casarez on page 1008 undertook to 
prevent: "If a defendant were not allowed to correct an error at 
the time of sentencing, the error is likely to go undetected for 
as long as the defendant remains subject to the criminal justice 
system, since the presentence report remains in the file of the 
defendant and is used by the Board of Pardons and other 
authorities in making decisions as to the length and terms of his 
incarceration, rehabilitation and parole." 
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If the A.G. had any concern for the public good, it 
would be trying to identify the plea-bargain inmates, expecting 
minimum punishment, who never saw the contents of their reports, 
then take steps to now allow review and correction before the 
Parole Board uses the same lies to add more time. Twenty out of 
twenty-two I asked had not seen theirs. We could each be out 
earning a living and paying taxes and saving the taxpayers 
$18,000 per year per inmate. 
III. MISCELLANEOUS DISCUSSION/ARGUMENT 
When my lawyer went into chambers with the prosecutor to 
hand the judge the latter's Notice of Intent to Present Evidence 
and Use Hearsay Testimony and Sentence Recommendation (two 
documents of whose existence or content I stayed unaware), my 
statutory rights under 77-35-13 were violated. The first 
document contained graphic descriptions of all the evidence taken 
by search warrant, while the other speculated what that evidence 
showed was going on in my mind leading up to the crime. In so 
doing, these three officers of the Court effected a conspiracy to 
deprive me of the Constitutional and statutory due process right 
that "the circumstances must be presented by the testimony of 
witnesses in open court... No affidavit or testimony of any 
kind, verbal or written, shall be offered to or received by the 
Court or a judge thereof...M 
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My appeal lawyer was so incompetent, he failed to cite 
that Utah statute. He also failed, as he was reading Lipsky, to 
notice its proscribing what they did by saying on page 1247 that 
"basic decisions affecting the disposition of a defendant and his 
liberty ought not to be based on ex parte communications to the 
judge making the decision." Ex parte occurred when my fate was 
decided without my knowledge or presence. It is also known as a 
star chamber proceeding. If Mr. Larsen still plans to use the 
"if he didn't then, he can't do it now" ploy, I suggest a look at 
13 ALR 4th 20 summary of Commonwealth v. Allen (1980) 421 A2d 
1094 which says "Ineffectiveness of counsel constitutes 
extraordinary circumstances precluding a finding of waiver." 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
My Petition's evidence and Court documents show how I, 
in addition to not having effective appellate counsel, was denied 
due process to have made a knowing guilty plea, to examine 
sentencing documents, to rebut an inaccurate presentence report, 
and to have effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. This 
Memorandum shows precisely how these deprivations violate the 
Constitution of Utah and the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Bill of 
Rights Amendments. This showing secures my right to 
consideration of a second successive petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
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I, therefore, pray my incarceration be declared illegal 
and my immediate release be ordered. 
Notes: (1) I ask that Mr. Larsen, should he feel duty 
bound to file to dismiss, be required to mail me any included 
decisions I haven't cited in my Memorandum; (2) I ask notice be 
taken of accompanying Motion That Petition Not Be Filed In Judge 
Rigtrup's Court, because he stated he does not review conviction 
proceedings (the purpose of habeas corpus) because that would be 
to "second guess" the trial judge; (3) I am now also filing a 
Pauper's Oath Affidavit and (4) a Motion to be appointed pro bono 
counsel. 
Respectfully submitted this day of , 
1990. 
NEWTON C. ESTES, Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this /sf* day of 
Anril, 1991. I did hand carry four true and correct copies 
of the within and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT tot 
Dan Larsen, Assistant Attorney General of Utah, 236 State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84114. 
<?UJMj^ t4u7As 
Salty Esftes, wife of Plaintiff 
